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American policy on genocide prevention often reads like a children’s story or a
screenplay for a Hollywood B-movie. The ‘‘bad guys’’ (the wolves) are committing
horrific acts against innocent civilians (the sheep) out of sheer malice and can only
be stopped by the ‘‘good guys’’ wearing the uniform of the US Army. The problem is
that this approach not only dominates the media, but it has also become popular
among academics.
Many well-intentioned Americans, outraged at the human suffering shown on
network news broadcasts, call for immediate action to ‘‘stop genocide’’ at any cost.
And because of the media’s political agenda, this usually means human rights abuses
in the Sudan rather than in Colombia or Sri Lanka. However, this ‘‘buy now’’ televi-
sion marketing of foreign policy is hardly conducive to serious academic discussions of
such a complex and contradictory phenomenon as systematic mass murder.
The Rule of Law
Simplistic calls for trigger-happy intervention in ‘‘genocide hotspots’’ ignore the fact
that America too is bound by the rule of law. Ever since the first moral codes were
developed by the Ancient Egyptians, Hebrews, and Babylonians, the primary pur-
pose of law has been to repress or control our innate capacity for evil so that we can
live together in peaceful communities. Similarly, modern international law, which
began as an attempt to safeguard territorial sovereignty in the seventeenth century
in Europe, has developed into a complex set of constraints to prevent us from harm-
ing others.
True, there have been attempts in the past to create a form of ‘‘enemy criminal
law.’’ The logic of such legislation is simple: those who fail in their duties as citizens
forfeit their rights as citizens and can be treated as enemies. We need only define
someone as a bad guy in order to place him or her beyond the law and give free
rein to our worst impulses. Legislation of this kind has a long history in Europe
where it has been used, among other things, to legitimate the Nazi genocide.
According to the West, in particular the United States, during the Cold War
period the bad guys were the Communists in the East. Behind the Iron Curtain
lurked the Red Menace and beyond that the Yellow Peril. Once the Cold War was
over, this division of the world into capitalist (good guys) and Marxist (bad guys)
was no longer sustainable. However, there has been renewed interest in enemy
criminal law in the wake of 9/11. For example, the concept of ‘‘ illegal enemy com-
batants’’ as developed recently by the Bush administration has allowed a stigmatized
and dehumanized enemy to be imprisoned and tortured without trial, habeas corpus
rights, or due process of law.
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Down the Slippery Slope
Equally serious is the fact that the same massive and systematic human rights
violations that were ignored during the Cold War era because they supposedly
helped to defeat the common enemy are being used as an excuse for a new model
of intervention in the twenty-first century. An insidious logic links Samantha
Power’s criticism of the United Nations and the US government for failing to
‘‘prevent genocide’’1 to the Responsibility to Protect (a US responsibility, of course)
and, from there, to the explicit modes of intervention laid out in the Mass Atrocity
Response Operations (MARO) Report, a technical operations manual for US military
intervention to prevent mass atrocities.
The Responsibility to Protect, together with a distinctly American interpretation
of the concept, is mentioned explicitly in the opening pages of the report:
The MARO Project has emerged in parallel with growing consensus around the
international norm of the ‘‘responsibility to protect’’ (R2P). The R2P concept was
introduced in the 2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty (ICISS), which shifted the discussion away from the debate about
whether a state had the right to intervene to save civilians at risk and toward the
formulation of a state’s ‘‘responsibility to protect’’ global citizens.2
On the next page, the report defines the roles assigned to the international community:
The UN General Assembly has articulated a requisite Security Council process for
international decision-making about the use of military force in R2P situations. The
MARO Project, as such, is agnostic about the politics; the concepts and tools we
are developing can be used in an R2P case, in a ‘‘humanitarian intervention,’’ or
whenever national leadership decides it needs to conduct a MARO. (12–13)
But whoa! Hold your horses. . . . Who decides that an atrocity crime is taking place
somewhere on the planet? Which international body is ultimately responsible for
these military interventions to stop genocide? And how do we ensure that inter-
vention does not bring about more deaths than it is intended to prevent? How
do we prevent a rerun of Iraq or even Kosovo, to mention just two examples from
the report?
These are not merely academic questions. US intelligence reports about weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq led to a unilateral intervention that has cost tens
of thousands of civilian lives. Unconfirmed reports put the figure as high as several
hundred thousand. On the other hand, Carne Ross, the former first secretary at the
United Kingdom’s mission to the United Nations, told the Chilcot inquiry in July
2010 that there was no ‘‘ ‘significant intelligence’ to support claims that Saddam
Hussein had amassed an arsenal of deadly weapons’’ and that ‘‘Britain was taken
to war in Iraq on the basis of ‘lies,’ scaremongering and deliberate exaggeration.’’3
Why then should we assume that reports of mass atrocities will be any more reliable?
It is disturbing, to say the least, that MARO seems to give the US government
a free hand to intervene anywhere in the world without the need for regional or
international agreements. It is also disappointing that the report focuses only on
the ‘‘willingness to act’’ without taking into account what is known about policies of
extermination and the origin and nature of evil in the world.
Milgram, Evil, and Obedience
Most readers of this journal will be familiar with Stanley Milgram’s 1963 experi-
ments on obedience.4 Briefly, subjects were told to give what they believed to be
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electric shocks to a ‘‘learner’’ (in fact, a paid actor) for nothing worse than failing to
memorize a list of word pairs. They were asked to increase the voltage by 15 volts for
each wrong answer. Even though the victim began to scream and displayed apparent
signs of pain at the 150-volt level, two thirds of the subjects were persuaded to
administer a massive 450-volt electric shock and only one third refused to administer
shocks between the 150- and 300-volt levels.
The important thing about these experiments is that Milgram’s subjects were
ordinary Americans—professional people, technicians, housewives, teachers, and
students. The experiments were designed to see if the subjects would obey immoral
orders as many ordinary Germans had done under the Nazis. Of course, the usual
objection to Migram’s results (apart from ethical considerations) is that the world
has changed since 1963. However, Jerry Burger’s 2006 partial replication of the
experiments found obedience rates almost identical to those found by Milgram.5
This is a reminder, if one is needed, that Americans are as human as the rest of
the world’s populations and that the United States is just another community within
the international arena. The fact that most of us can be persuaded to torture another
human being for no good reason should make us more cautious about unilateral
military intervention. How do we ensure, for example, that new Abu Ghraibs or
Guantanamos do not spring up all over the occupied territories? The risk seems
especially high in Africa, which is portrayed in the report as a veritable breeding
ground for genocide.
The Limitations of Binary Logic
The MARO Handbook’s 161 pages are packed with hard-to-decode acronyms describ-
ing how to reduce American casualties in various military interventions to stop
atrocities. But there is little advice on how to limit ‘‘enemy’’ civilian casualties.
Pages 70 to 87 describe seven different military intervention strategies: saturation,
oil spot, separation, safe areas, partner enabling, containment, defeat perpetrators.
In the section on containment there is one brief paragraph about the possibility of
‘‘collateral damage’’ from the indiscriminate shelling of the areas under the control
of the ‘‘aggressor nation’’ (68). But collateral damage here refers primarily to third-
party populations and victims of the aggressor state. The report seems to assume
that civilians of a state that violates human rights are automatically accessories to
these crimes and so their deaths are of no importance.
These oversights are inevitable if we reduce our prevention model to how to
get the good guys to have the political will to neutralize the bad guys. The report’s
implicit Manichaeistic worldview makes too many assumptions that are never named
or addressed:
1. There is only one way to detect mass atrocities worldwide; this method is
reliable and would never be distorted to justify a military attack for any other
purpose (e.g., to overthrow an anti-American regime, to control natural
resources such as water or oil, or to control a vital geopolitical territory).
2. Mass atrocities tend to be one-sided with a perpetrator population that either
commits or supports genocide and a victim population that is helpless.
3. These atrocities can be prevented by the use of military force. It is enough to
defeat the perpetrators in order to liberate the victims—a classic Hollywood
happy ending.
But not only Hollywood is to blame for these simplistic views. The report reflects the
growing trivialization of genocide since the term was coined nearly seventy years
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ago. A simplistic model has emerged that requires each case of genocide to have one
and only one victim and one and only one perpetrator. Victims, perpetrators, and
accomplices that do not fit the model are ignored or rendered invisible.
For example, the Holocaust is often reduced to the persecution of Jews by
Germans under the Nazis. Little attention is given to the other victims of Nazism—
3 million non-Jewish Poles, 3.3 to 3.5 million Russian prisoners of war, and hun-
dreds of thousands Sinti and Roma. Even less attention is given to the hundreds of
thousands of German victims, including not only Jews, Sinti, and Roma but also
political dissidents, Jehovah’s Witnesses, homosexuals, the unemployed, and the
handicapped. The Austrians, Croatians, Hungarians, French, Latvians, Lithuanians,
Poles, and Romanians who also killed and tortured are forgotten.
In the same way, genocide scholars tend to focus on the massacre of Armenians
between 1915 and 1923, ignoring the large numbers of Greek and Syrian Christians
who were also murdered by the Young Turk Ittihadist party during the same period.
More recently, oblivion has befallen the Hutu moderates killed in the Rwandan
genocide in which Hutu militias mainly targeted Tutsis. However, the complex
system of interrelated conflicts in the former Yugoslavia has proven impossible to
explain away using a banal dualism of ‘‘goodies’’ and ‘‘baddies,’’ even if the Serbs
could play the role of the bad guys. Attempts to label the current conflicts in the
Sudan in terms of Arab Muslims against black Christians have similarly turned out
to be oversimplified. Most of the groups involved are Muslim and black and define
themselves as Arab.
All of this is not to say that the report’s recommendations might not be of use
to international organizations—and I stress the word international—where mass
atrocities really are being committed by bad guys against good guys. But most
conflicts are more complicated than the CNN would have us believe.
Counterinsurgency Doctrine: A Blast from the Past
One good thing about MARO is that it makes no bones about where it is coming
from. Its authors took part in the US invasion of Iraq and the opening paragraphs
make it clear that this is their model for ‘‘intervention.’’ Describing the origins of
the project, the report states:
The US military has long focused on preparation for major conventional operations,
rather than preparing for other types of military operations. As it struggled with
counterinsurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States military realized
that preparation for conventional warfare was inadequate for some other military
challenges. MAROs also generate such unique requirements. (5)
A few pages later, the report describes the role played by counterinsurgency doctrine
in designing different forms of intervention:
Counterinsurgency (COIN) has some aspects that are similar to those of mass atrocity
response. COIN also prominently features the civilian, along with insurgents and
local and/or foreign counterinsurgents. Insurgent and counterinsurgent forces com-
pete for civilian loyalties using positive (protection/assistance) and negative (threats/
violence) actions, and some civilians will be allied more closely with the competing
groups. (25)
This comparison is an interesting one. Throughout the Cold War, French and then
American counterinsurgency doctrines brought terror to Latin America, Indonesia,
Vietnam, and parts of Africa and Southeast Asia. They led to hundreds of thousands
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of deaths in political, ethnonational, and religious genocides. Now, the same techni-
ques designed to commit those crimes are thought suitable to prevent them.
The really frightening thing about this golden oldie remake, however, is that
non-victimized civilians no longer deserve protection: ‘‘ in COIN, all civilian protec-
tion is instrumental and relevant to the sides’ competition for legitimacy. In a
MARO, protection of civilians victimized by perpetrators is the core objective of
the mission’’ (25). This is the enemy criminal law doctrine mentioned earlier. In
Hollywood it is cheaper these days to use computer animation than to shoot
hundreds of extras.
UNASUR and the Crises in Bolivia, Honduras, and Ecuador
To their credit, supporters of military intervention argue that we cannot simply
stand by and do nothing while atrocity crimes are being committed. But again, this
is binary thinking. I wish now to consider a case study which shows that other
options exist.
During the Cold War era, Latin America was ravaged by military dictatorships
supported directly or indirectly by the US State Department. Since then, countries
in the region have embarked on a process of political empowerment and regional
reorganization. One of the institutions to emerge from this process is the Union of
South American Nations (UNASUR), which is made up of twelve Latin American
nations. Strangely, UNASUR is never mentioned in the MARO report, which refers
to only one regional institution: the African Union.
Nevertheless, since the UNASUR Constitutive Treaty was signed on May 23,
2008, UNASUR has helped three countries in the region that have suffered
attempted coups: Bolivia (2008), Honduras (2009), and Ecuador (2010). In each
case there was a major crisis with the strong potential to trigger atrocity crimes.
The Bolivian crisis commenced in September 2008 with the massacre of poor
campesinos by right-wing militias acting on the orders of the governor of Pando, the
country’s northernmost province. The US Embassy in Bolivia not only failed to
condemn the attempted coup—technically, a civic coup as the armed forces were not
involved—but seemed to actively support it. However, a swift diplomatic response by
UNASUR prevented the coup from spreading.
Officials from several Latin American countries traveled to Bolivia to show
support for Evo Morales and persuade his democratically elected government to
ignore calls for revenge from the Bolivian indigenous movement. Instead, a commis-
sion of inquiry was set up to look into the Pando massacre and advise on appropriate
sentencing. The situation in Bolivia remains tense and is monitored each month.
However, there have been no new crimes or attempts to overthrow the government.
The Honduran crisis started when President Manuel Zelaya was ousted by a
military coup in June 2009. Zelaya was expelled from Honduras, but he returned
and took refuge in the Brazilian embassy, where he was granted political asylum.
The response from UNASUR and OAS (the Organization of American States) mem-
bers was immediate: they refused to recognize the military government and instead
called for the deposed president to be reinstated and for a democratic commission to
investigate crimes committed by the rebels.
The new Obama administration initially agreed to the UNASUR and OAS initia-
tive but later recognized the government that emerged from a rigged election called
by the rebels in November 2009. Unfortunately, Honduras is one of the poorest coun-
tries in Latin America and, unlike Bolivia and Ecuador, it depends heavily on trade
with the United States instead of trade with UNASUR members. So, Manuel Zelaya
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never returned to power and the killing of journalists and political activists has
continued under the ‘‘elected’’ government.
Finally, the Ecuadorean crisis began in September 2010 when riot police
kidnapped and threatened to kill President Rafael Correa. On the same day,
presidents of UNASUR countries met in Buenos Aires, declared the coup illegal,
and sent their foreign ministers to Quito to defend the deposed president with the
threat of sanctions if necessary. Arguably, the coup was just a well-planned mutiny
since no leaders came forward to proclaim a new government. However, UNASUR’s
rapid condemnation almost certainly played an important role in persuading Ecuador’s
armed forces to intervene and free Correa, restoring institutional stability to the
country.
To Thy Own Self Be True
Of course, this is not the only form of intervention possible and once atrocities are
being committed, diplomatic efforts and verbal condemnations may not be enough
to stop them. Stronger interventions, including the use of military force, might
be necessary. However, because of the enormous risks involved in peacekeeping
missions, including the possibility that the conflict will escalate, the decision to
intervene militarily should never be made by just one nation, not even the United
States. Only regional organizations have the legitimacy and authority to make such
decisions.
If we accept this principle, then some of the techniques suggested in the report
might actually work as long as there are thorough checks to prevent the sort of
human rights abuses and collateral damage we have seen in Iraq. However, we
should remember that some conflicts have been raging for centuries and that a
peaceful solution to a conflict has a greater chance of being a lasting one. Quick and
easy answers may satisfy our moral outrage, but in the long run they lead to greater
suffering.
Let us also remember that we, as scholars, have a responsibility not to deny or
distort the concepts that have developed over decades of fighting for the victims of
gross and systematic violations of human rights. To borrow a line from the American
actor and humorist, Will Rogers, ‘‘There’s only one thing that can kill the movies,
and that’s education.’’
Welcome to reality.
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